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I. Apartheid and Militarism in Southern Africa; The Zimbabwe Experience
Apartheid in South Africa is internationally notorious as a system of 
national oppression, racial discrimination, and extreme repression.
Black people in South Africa are classified into three 'racial groups' - 
.. Africans, the so called Coloured (i.e. people of mixed racial descent) 
and Asians (predominantly of Indian origin). Although the particular forms 
of racial discrimination to which these groups are subject differ slightly, 
the racist system has for many years placed them all in,conditions of 
brutal oppression. Black people in South Africa have no effective 
- political rights and ho freedom of movement. The official state policy 
denies that Africans are even South Africans. The State machinery 
is totally dominated by whites. Blacks may not own land in the 875o 
of the country deemed to be 'white South Africa'. They may not choose 
freely where to live, where to work, or where to send their children 
to school. On grounds of their .'race', blacks are denied access to 
, a'wide range of facilities and amenities available to whites. Taken 
together, all the oppressive measures of apartheid have produced a 
situation in which mo'st of the wealth of South Africa is in the hands
■of four - and - a half million whites, while the overwhelming majority• / ' ’
1of the 25,million blacks in South Africa live in poverty.
All this is known : it has been exhaustively catalogued in numerous 
publications, and we shall not dwell: on it in this pacer. Rather our 
concern is how to. understand the development arid operation of the racis 
apartheid system in the form of destabilisation in Zimbabwe and the 
measures Zimbabwe is prepared to take in order to do away with the 
Apartheid system in South Africa. The paper argues that without the
2-
eradicatian of apartheid in South Africa there will be no peace 
in the Southern African region.
In the last few years South Africa's destabilization policy has 
received increasing attention and so there might be the impression
M
that the apartheid state's destabilization policy is of recent ' 
veritage. In fact, the destabilization policy is at least ten
years old, if one takes note of Pretoria's 1975/76 invation of
- - • “ ~ ■ - 
and debacle in Angola when it, together with the U.S.A., unsuccess-
,*“ • ✓  ' . - j
fully tried to defeat MPLA arid ensure a UNITA/FNLA government
s' *
in Angola by the time of Angola's Independence in November 1975. 
Further, if one takes into account Pretoria's economic,-political 
and military support of rebel Rhodesia, its illegal occupation 
of Namibia (in which South Africa's mandate was terminated by 
the U..N. General Assembly in 1966, where in South Africa's was _ 
proclaimed to be in illegal occupation by the U.N. Security Council 
in 1969, and the International Court of Justice declared, South 
Africa to be in illegal occupation of Namibia and confirmed the 
Security Council's 1969 call for its. withdrawal), then clearly 
South Africa's regional destablisa.tion policy goes back to the mid 
1960s. But it goes, back even further in time if one ftakes a
continental view of destablisation, becausp of South Africa'
vmilitary . arid economic-support for the Tshonbe secession, in K tanga
in 1961 which line of action continued .with support for the iafra
2secession during 1967-70.
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,n. ' THE APARTHEID 5TATE IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICA^ REGION; An Overview.
N -  4
The interventions by the apartheid state in the Southern African
v 1 ’ ’ • ' * \ •
. region - in the form of military incursions, assassinations economic 
destabilisation, offers of economic 'co-operation' through a 
• ' 'constellation of states', and proposed land cessions - are a
large part of the daily news of this region,^ Yet they should 
all be seen as particular tactics in a relatively coherent regional 
strategy developed under the Botha regime. In part, this should . 
be understood as an aspect of the Total Strategy of the regime, 
and in,part in the context of the history and specific dynamic
of regional policy.
X
III. , CONDITIONS GIVING RISE TO THE TOTAL STRATEGY
From 1978 to 1984 South Africa's domestic and regional policies 
wpre consistently oriented around a coherent strategic vision 
\ of the conditions necessary to ensure1 the survival of apartheid. , 
Known as the"Total Strategy, this involved a complex mix of domestic 
"reform" and,regional intervention. Clearly the Total Strategy 
was a direct response to four developments of the early 1970s: .
a) the reemergence, after nearly a decade of political quiescence,
'  '  i
of the new forms of organised, large-scale black opposition.
The bloody suppression of the 197^ Soweto uprising clearly^.
" . • indicated that the apartheid stats could not continue in
/ " " • • I
the old way and that some form of change was essential to 
its survival.
b) The onset of a deep recession. All the leading business
people insisted that the easing of| restrictions on the bobility
* and training of black labour, in order to permit its more
■ ' ■. . . . .  : v ( 
productive employment in more hiqhly capital-intensive forms
i * •
of production, was essential' to any economic recovery.
c) . The .defeat of Portuguese^colonialism and the independence
of Angola and Mozambique under socialist governments, followed 
by the debacle of the first South African invasion of Angola
in 1975-76, the humiliating withdrawal of the South African ^
\ , * army, and the collapse of Pretoria's "detente" initiative,
all showed >the. need for a new, vision of South Africa's
regional role.
d) The growing international condemnation of South Africa and 
its isolation from its major allies - embodied in the U.S. 
vote for a/mandatory arms embargo and demand for "one person,
v' ' „
one vote" in 1977, together with the growing threat of sanctions
• ■ ; ' l x
showed the need for a dramatic improvement' in image.
In 1977, the. Department of Defence had argued.that South Africa 
faced, a "total onslaught". It advocated the mobilization of 
the full range of resources' at the disposal of the slate in order 
to preserve the '-'.free enterprise system".^ this was ■ Total 
Strategy, and it was a strategic .shift away from the cruder forms 
of apartheid. It .sought to restructure specific aspects of apartheid
capitalism in order to preserve its basic r rameters, to defuse
}
developing mass unrest, and ■’ i reduce South A'rica's- nternational 
isolation. And;the Tote.': Strategy had bott domestic and regional,
components. ' , .N /* - •, . • 1
hoe regional component of the Total Strategy rested, on an attempt
to internanationalize the problems confronting the apartheid 
state.. Its strategists argued that the source of instability
and conflict, both within South Africa and across the'entire
. . • -  . ~ . , /
region, was neither apartheid nor colonialism'but external inter­
vention. Elaborate theories of a "total onslaught" against 5outh 
Africa, orchestrated by the Soviet Union but sometimes including 
the Carter Administration and even the CIA, were proposed.
The fundamental objective of South African policy was now defined 
as the creation of a Constellation. fo?5outhern African,states 
(CONSAS). Recognizing that apartheid was a barrier to formal 
alliances with neighbouring stgteS, part of this tactic involved
. . . .  -  . , i f
raising the specter of "Marxism" in order to generate a counter-
strategy. Pretoria argued;therefore that all the states in the
. . . .  ' ' 1 ' ' . '. 
region faced a common "Marxist" enemy,, and that they could not
rely on the Western powers for Support. It proposed "regional
solutions" to this allegedly "regional problem". By. so doing,;
Suuth Africa hoped that its international isolation could be
eroded through'a transformation of regional relations.
■ . • > i
\ - . ■ ' . • ■ ,
Over and above.its primary objective of forging a "Constellation1 ' . - 'V - -„ ' ■ ■ ’ S ' '
of States", the Total Strategy pursued five related regional 
objectives.. In brief, these are: ' .
1. Erhruring that neighbouring' states would ref: sir, from .cti\6l>
; supporting the armed struggles led by SWAPO in Namibia anci 
. ANC in South Africa, .and obliging them to act as Victual 
Policing agents for South Africa by prohibiting political -
activity by South African and.Namibian refugees in their
' ' ■  ‘ - . v '  ’ ‘  i - • ' '  .
■I
’ ’ , _ . ' . ' ' . - I :
territory. ' . ■ ' , ; .
2. . Ensuring that "Soviet-bloc powers" (including Cuba) would gain
neither a political- nor mi 111 ary foothold anywhere in the '
• \ , t
. region.' Pretoria objected even to any state establishing v
normal,diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. . . .
3. Strengthening existing regional ties, as noted above.
4. Ensuring that "black states" in the region Vyould not support., 
calls for mandatory sanctions against South Africa and that 
they shield South Africa from such sanctions. .
5v inducing moderation in the "heady anti-South African .rhetoric" 
of the region.^ . .
CQN5A5 COLLAPSES :
Thfe Botha's dream of Consas was naive, because it.was built on 
two false assumptions: first that Muzorewa would win an .election 
in Zimbabwe, and sefcond that, the majority - ruled neighboured.. 
shared the fear of a communist onslaught. . •
We should note here that Zimbabwe was the keystone tc Sr- regional 
grouping. The Frontline states (PLS) and m e  Botha's a; ; rthr-id • 
regime unveiled their pldns ip 1979 on the assumption that their 
side would win in Zimbabwe. The firpt shock to Pretoria Wats 
the massive ZANU-PF victory in Zimbabwe on "4 March 1780. On"
■ April Robert 'Mugabe took Z, mbabwe -into S' find SAD C ri the-r-' 
ian^CONSA^. The. sepond shock was when all three otner non-FLS 
members also joined SADCC. This meant that Apartheid was seen 
os more evil than Socialism. ' . ’ ,
Lesotho, although totally surrounded by South.Africa, had been '
moving steadily away from it politically; for example, in, 1978,
.1" ' . \  1 ■ ■ ' ■ " '  1
Lesotho hosted an UN anti-apartheid semiriar and opened warm relations
with Mozambique. Malawi, the only majority-ruled state in Africa ' 
to have diplomatic links with Pretoria, h'ad sharply , cut the number 
of migrant miners going to South Africa, reduced its purchases 
from South Africa (from 41 per cent of total imports in 1979
to 32 per cent in 1981), and was quietly building better links_ . • - • " ' ' . ■ ' ■ - 
. ' i' 1 ■ • . . ' * • -with its neighbours. , ,
Swaziland too, was moving away; it gave tacit agreement for ANC 
guerrillas to pass from Mozambique through Swaziland to South 
Africa, and became more critical of apartheid. On 6 April 1981 -­
it hosted a meeting of the heads of Mozambique, Botswana, and > 7 
Lesotho which issued a,comminique denouncing 'attempts by south 
Africa to destabilize Ker neighbouring black-ruled states'?
, Thus none of the neighbouring states were willing to be'seen 
consorting with' apartheid and the,bantustans, and all Supported 
delinking. (With its CONSAS plans undermined, the Apartheid rename 
appeared unsure- cf its,immediate regional objectives; and ourin 
the second phase - from mid-1980. to the end of 1981 - it lashed
out in a fairly indiscriminate way. Direct military action, . v
‘' ' • ' . ' • * ■, i . . '' . •. •
and indirect aggression through puppet groups, was; taken agains
Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe.- In Namibia, a "dual
track" strategy rought 'to build the "jrtern&l settlement" unc,,: .
the DTA, while escalating, military attacks against SWAPO bases
in Angola in order to weaken it militarily and politically.
-B-
Compared withwhat was to follow, however, the destabilization 
measures taken up until end of 1981 were relatively mild. By 
early 1982 Pretoria seemed to have recovered -from 'the "loss of 
-Rhodesia" .and had worked out-its immediate regional objectively . 
more precisely. South Africa now divided the states of the region 
into threeJjroad categories and used a different mixrof tactics 
against each. More conservative states, such as Swaziland and 
Malawi, were seen as real or potential collaborators and offered 
concessions in order to encourage them to deepen their ties with 
Pretoria, or as rewards for "good behaviour".
The second category of.regional states identified by Pretoria 
were those considered unfriendly.to South Africa but vulnerable 
to pressure, such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe; the third encompassed 
those whose political systems and development strategies were 
seen as a direct threat to Pretoria's interests, particularly 
Mozambique and Angola. iBoth groups were singled out for intensified
■ \. g"
and sustained military and economic destabilization.
\ ' - - o .
Limitations of space prohibit a'discussion of - the s.usi• ined and. 
vicious assault on the countries of Southern Africa that has 
taken place from mid-1980 up to the present moment. We shall, 
therefore, confine ourselves to the Zimbabwe Experience, bearing 
in mind that, economic, military and poll ■ jcal methods most conjmbnly 
•used by South Africa i. gainst neighbourin' o .. i utes a e- normally • 
grouped together under the heading of 'destabilization'.'
Destabilization represents the "outward move" of trie militarized 
. . : ] ~ 
state even while it continues to suppress,and opress the majority
/
- 9
of South Africans and indeed destabilization is the perfect
linkage between the apartheid state's domestic and forein policies ?
/ : • , ■ ■
\
V. . Zimbabwe Experience 1
At the centre,of the region both politically and geographically, 
Zimbabwe was the biggest threat to South African hegemony. Robert 
Mugabe's joint policies of Socialism and reconciliation raised 
the threat of a prosperous multiracial state which would challenge 
South Africa's Apartheid policy. Zimbabwe is also critical to 
SADCC because it is literally the hub of regional transport and'
. ■, would be thus be central in re-directing traffic away fron^South 
‘ Africa. - ■ , •
In order to prevent the Southern African States from becoming 
economically independent from South Africa, the apartheid regime 
■used the following methods in brief to destabilize Zimbabwe and 
other Southern African black states:
disinformation, (e.g. hundreds of letters and anti-government 
leaflets sent, to Zimbabwe in 1983 and 193i) '
/
- , long-term inyasion/occupation (e.g. Namibia since 1966 and 
.v;r Angola since 1975-76).
attempted assassinations of Prime Ministers and senior government/ 
party members (e.g., 13 December 1981 borro attack on ZANU i .
, HQ in Ha-are), \
assassinations/murders of liberation movement leaoers and 
other personnel (e.g. Maseru, Harare, Maputo,Lusaka, Gaborone 
during 1981-1983), '
attacks on oil installations and routes (e.g. in Mozambique,
/
-1 u - '
Angola, and Lesotho since 1980),
attacks on military installations (e.g. Inkomo Barracks and
Thornhill Air Base in Zimbabwe 16 August, 19B1 and' July' 25, 1982 
respectively),
Traihing, supplying, directing surrogate armies in neighbouring 
states (e.g. UNITA in Angola, MNR in Mozambique, LLA in 
Lesotho and Super-ZAPU in Zimbabwe),
attacks on transport routes (e.g. closures of the Benguela,
Railway in Angola, the Zimbabwe-Maputo line, the Malawi- 
Nacala line, the Malawi-Beira line, and attacks on the Zimbabwe-
Beira road/rail line, during,1975-1980),
. • /
port/border inspection of cargo, harassment of transport
‘ , i
personnel (e.g. for Zimbabwe-and Zambia 1986), 
limiting the use of South African railways, for example 
by manipi^lating_the availability of railway wagens, .(done
i '
to Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia).
Restrictions on migrant labour, (done to Zimbabwe, Mozambique 
and Lesotho threaded). ■'
i ’. -1
Border closures and restrictions, (done to all immediate 
neighbours: Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe,- Botswana and Mozambiqtie) 
Curbing imports from neighbouring states, (done to Zimbabwe, 
and Swaziland). i
Regulating the export of goods to ^lack states, especially 
’food and oil' Vdon. to Botswana, Lesotho, 1 awi, Mozambio. r. ' , 
Zambia and Zimbabwe).
Restricting South African tourists (done to Lesotho and 
Swaziland).
Violating the customs union agreement (done to all three
/' other members: Botswana, Leso.tho. and Swaziland)
1 ■ ' )
VI. The follbwing are details-of selected incidents mentioned above:
- The first incident occured on ^ August-19B1 .' Joe Gqabr, 
representative of the 'AI)lC in Zimbabwe was assassinated outside' 
his Harare house. The murder weapon was never found. Later 
it emerged that Gqabi had been targetted by the South Africans 
and eliminated by a squad sent into Zimbabwe to do the job.
\
The next incident in the sequence occurred on.16 August 1981., ) 
A series of massive explosions ripped through the armoury 
at Inkomo Barracks,near Harare destroying $36 million worth 
of armaments. . This was done by South African Agents,.
- On 18 December 1981, a ten-to-fifteen kologram bomb exploded 
on the roof of the ZANU PF headquarters at 88 Manica Road,
'Harare. This was aimed at.the ZANU leadership.
On 23rd July 1982, six tourists - two Americans, tvo Australians
1 . t
and two Britons were abducted by bandits on the rocd from
1 ' • •,
. Bulawayo to Victoria Falls. This was to underrtine Zimbabwe's 
tourist industry.
- 23th July, a quarter of Zimbabwe's air force planes were
sabotaged on the ground at the Thornhill base near Gweru/ ' ■ ■
in the centre of the country.by South Africa.
Intelligence analysis around 1982 defined the strategic 
intentions of the ocndits in-three pvopes. Ths fust .phase 
was to recover cached weapons not yet located by the government, 
and to train and arm recruits. Phase two was to attack 
isolated economic targets .such as white commercial farms,
10
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stores etc. Phase three was to attack police stations, army 
posts and security force'patrols with the objective of making 
' Matabeleland ungovernably. This had the support fo South 
Africa.
Two other weapons, non-lethal but nevertheless destabilizing, 
which South Africa uses against Zimbabwe are propaganda 
and disinformation. Zimbabwean monitors first picked up 
a new station called Radio Truth on 15 March 1983, no long . 
after the South Africans were known to have become involved 
with Super^Zapu. The new clandestine station brojdcast 
initially in Ndebel'e and Shona.at 7 AM and 7.30 PM daily.
Reception was poor and a change of frequency in June, brought . 
with it the introduction of broadcasts in English at 6.30 AM 
and 7 PM. But reception remained poor. A further frequency 
change improved^the. quality of the reception of broadcasts • ' 
in English but the reception in Ndebele and Shona remained : , ■ ' 
of a poor quality - the transimitt.er, was. located near Johannesburg 
at the Meyerton Studios of SABC. i
The Touth African campaign of disinformation against Zimbabwe ' 
has ceen affected ip a number of ways, especially through 
unsolocited publications and circulars, a number of them
mailed from Swiss Cottage, in London, and attacks or, individuals
r 'i •
through anonymous letters. The earliest ease of disinformation ' 
was detected soon after inc nendence vhen publications were 
distributed claiming the'formation of a new party, Super-Zanu, 
in which members of the existing Zanu leadership were said 
to be prominent.
V
I
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The disinformation campaign was stepped up in 1983 after 
the creation of Super-Zapu. Prominent politicians, diplomatic 
missions and individuals received a series of letters which 
purported .to originate from a "Joe Moyo", said to be a member 
of the ZPRA high command. ,
Fuel is another weapon South Africa has used to destabilize 
Zimbabwe. The rehabilitation of the Beira to Mutare oil 
pipeline, owned by the British transnational company Lonrho 
and closed during the UDI years, was a major post-independence 
priority. The reopening of the line was technically feasible 
by the end of 1981 but on 29 October the railway bridge 
over Pungwe river, which also carries the_pipeline, was 
damaged in a sabotage attack and the road bridge was totally 
destroyed. In December 1982 Zimbabwe suffered an acute 
fuel shortage which almost brought the country to a standstill, 
and resulted in queues at petrol stations that stretched 
for many kilometres. ^
 ^jch the cheapest rout;e to the sea for Zimbabwe is through 
C i-cual;cula, in the extreme south-east, to Maputo. This
I 1 - ■ v
was subjected to continous attack until the MMR closed it 
down completely on 2G August.1984. Thus, through its surrogates 
and thiough direct action, Pretbria forced Zimbabwe and 
ether .'..and-locked countries: to return, to almost total dep, ndence 
on South Africa1s trade routes. But Zimbabwe's response 
in committing troops to secure the Beira route obviously 
surprised Pretoria.. And in tit second half of 1983, faced 
with the prospect of the Chiciulacula route reopening by
- 14-
by Mid-1986 if security improved along the line, South Africa 
introduced a new tactic. This was a two-tier tariff structure, 
offering lower contract rates than those published, ,lhe'' 
new contract rates undercut the previous Chicualjacuala charges 
on four of Zimbabwe's main bulk exports - asbestors, tobacco, 
ferrochrome and steel. • The message was obvious. Even if ' . 
Chicualacuala was reopened it would be morg costly to return 
to the traditional Mozambique routes than to use South^Africa.
Not only was this a way of further destabilizing Mozambique 
by.dehying it fureign currency earnings but it also exerted
pressure on the Mugabe government.
1 '
the vulnerability of Zimbabwe and other land-locked countries 
in the region was' further demonstrated within a year of 
independence. First, South African" Railways began to extend , 
the turnaround time .for railway wagons, claiming there was 
excessive demand for rail transport. ■ Loading peiyday, particularly 
of diesel tankers, were reduced.' Then, , in April 1981, South 
Africa withdrev, 25 locomotives loaned to the previous government 
of' Rhodesia. It did this on so little notice that the Zimbabwe 
transport network was under severe, strain for some time, 
forcing the loss of orders and stockpiling of maize, steel,
sjgar for several weeks. Lost export earnings were estimated
1 • ■ 11 / 
c-\ Z$7- million, a week.
South Africa's destabilization in the first six years of
! '
independence cost Zimbabwe^millions of dollars in additional
,impor: and export tariff. , lost orders, property destroyed ^
' . ’ ’ > * 
by bandits, discouraged .nvestment and tourism. Beyond
that there was the cost of fni.lit.ary operations against the 
bandits at home, the cost of guarding the.Beira route and 
i n  Ju ly  1983, the  deployment o f  f j g h f j r i g  u n i t s  i n  Mozambique 
for a joint ..offensive against the MNR.
■' CONCLUSION
VII WHAT,IS .THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM?
More jthan six years after the independence of Zimbabwe and the 
foupding of SADCC, the war for the control of Southern Africa/ 
has dramatically intensified. On military, political and economic
. fronts, Pretoria is asserting its claim tp be a regional power.
' ■ '\  . ~
But also in replay SADCC is struggling to reduce .its economic
‘ ’ J ■ \ 1 • '
> dependence on South Africa. So far the wati is a costly draw.
' Pretoria has prevented the neighbours delinking and has forced
them into economic_decline, but it has failed to draw them back
completely into the fold. Destabilization now costs the SADCC
states more, than $4300 million per year. , These aggressive
\
activities constitute a growing threat to peace which cannot
, ■ V f
be confined to this region cr even this 'contine n[ ; it is an inter­
national problem. There should be a continuing effort to expose 
,the irrationality and hypocrisy of Western financial and technical 
resources being used to shore up a regime which is engaged in 
destroying economies which these same countries are helping to ^
•deve. ip. • Toda) 's wanton mi/it ary aggression'r if set;' t p ind( ; line 
two'related factors: *
(a) That the South African regime has adopted state terrorism 
as a poli’-y. That is bound' to lead to a dangerous security
-16-
1
situation in the region, because the victims' of such a policy
will have to.defend themselves.
■ ■ ' ’ '..■■■ ;' ■ / ; 
i (b) In order to guarantee peace and security in .the region.
the international community should take immediate steps to '
r • t
, isolate the South. African regime by imposing comprehensive
- 1 3  .
arid mandatory economic sanctions.
The 4fcmand for sanctions must be viewed i.n the context both of 
destabilization and Western support^ for the apartheid, regime.
Those: opposed to sanctions argue that they will hurt the neighbouring 
states;. Undoubtedly this is true. But if it accelerated the 
downfall of. apartheid, it would b.e well wortft the additional 
cost.:; It is in this light that Zimbabwe would like to see "The 
Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa" implemented which calls 
inter alia for the strickest enforcement of the mandatory arms 
embargo against (South Africa, in accordance with .United Nations
14
Security Council Resolutions 418 and 558.
Zimbrowe be!ieves therefore that the imposition of comprehensive 
/mandf tory s notions on the apartheid regime would .enlarge the ^
prospects of an orderly transition toysocial. economic and political 
justice in South Africa arid peace and stability in the Southern 
Africa region as a whole.
-17-
ANr
ABBREVIATIONS
' ■ African National Congress -(South Africa)
CONSAS
■ ? . ! \ . - ■ ' 
Constellation of Southern African States
FNLA National front for the Liberation of Angola
FLS Front Line States
FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front
MNR Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA " People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola-/ • . . ,
PAC PanrAfrican Congress .. .
PF •Patriotic Front] ;
PF-ZAPU , Patridtlc Front - Zimbabwe African People's Union
5ABC , , South African.Broadcasting. Corporation '
sadcc ; y Southern African Development Coordination Conference
5ADF ' jSouth Af;ric,an Defence Force t ! ;
SWAPO , South West African People's Organisation (Namibia)
UANC ; .United African National Council (Zimbabwe)
UNIT A National Union for the Total Independence, of Angola
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National' Liberation Army-
ZANU-PF Zimbabwean African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZPRA . ■, Zimbabwe'People1 s Revolutional. Army.
\
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